## 1nc

### 1nc – cir

#### CIR Will Pass Now – Obama Has the PC and Hes Pushing IT

By: Reid J. Epstein 10/17, 2013 Obama’s latest push features a familiar strategy http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=00B694F1-5D59-4D13-B6D1-FC437A465923

President Barack Obama made his plans for his newly won political capital official — he’s going to hammer House Republicans on immigration.¶ And it’s evident from his public and private statements that Obama’s latest immigration push is, in at least one respect, similar to his fiscal showdown strategy: yet again, the goal is to boost public pressure on House Republican leadership to call a vote on a Senate-passed measure.¶ “The majority of Americans think this is the right thing to do,” Obama said Thursday at the White House. “And it’s sitting there waiting for the House to pass it. Now, if the House has ideas on how to improve the Senate bill, let’s hear them. Let’s start the negotiations. But let’s not leave this problem to keep festering for another year, or two years, or three years. This can and should get done by the end of this year.”¶ (WATCH: Assessing the government shutdown's damage)¶ And yet Obama spent the bulk of his 20-minute address taking whack after whack at the same House Republicans he’ll need to pass that agenda, culminating in a jab at the GOP over the results of the 2012 election — and a dare to do better next time.¶ “You don’t like a particular policy or a particular president? Then argue for your position,” Obama said. “Go out there and win an election. Push to change it. But don’t break it. Don’t break what our predecessors spent over two centuries building. That’s not being faithful to what this country’s about.”¶ Before the shutdown, the White House had planned a major immigration push for the first week in October. But with the shutdown and looming debt default dominating the discussion during the last month, immigration reform received little attention on the Hill.¶ (PHOTOS: Immigration reform rally on the National Mall)¶ Immigration reform allies, including Obama’s political arm, Organizing for Action, conducted a series of events for the weekend of Oct. 5, most of which received little attention in Washington due to the the shutdown drama. But activists remained engaged, with Dream Act supporters staging a march up Constitution Avenue, past the Capitol to the Supreme Court Tuesday, to little notice of the Congress inside.¶ Obama first personally signaled his intention to re-emerge in the immigration debate during an interview Tuesday with the Los Angeles Univision affiliate, conducted four hours before his meeting that day with House Democrats.¶ Speaking of the week’s fiscal landmines, Obama said: “Once that’s done, you know, the day after, I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform.”¶ (Also on POLITICO: GOP blame game: Who lost the government shutdown?)¶ When he met that afternoon in the Oval Office with the House Democratic leadership, Obama said that he planned to be personally engaged in selling the reform package he first introduced in a Las Vegas speech in January.¶ Still, during that meeting, Obama knew so little about immigration reform’s status in the House that he had to ask Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.) how many members of his own party would back a comprehensive reform bill, according to a senior Democrat who attended.¶ The White House doesn’t have plans yet for Obama to participate in any new immigration reform events or rallies — that sort of advance work has been hamstrung by the 16-day government shutdown.¶ But the president emerged on Thursday to tout a “broad coalition across America” that supports immigration reform. He also invited House Republicans to add their input specifically to the Senate bill — an approach diametrically different than the House GOP’s announced strategy of breaking the reform into several smaller bills.¶ White House press secretary Jay Carney echoed Obama’s remarks Thursday, again using for the same language on immigration the White House used to press Republicans on the budget during the shutdown standoff: the claim that there are enough votes in the House to pass the Senate’s bill now, if only it could come to a vote.¶ “When it comes to immigration reform … we’re confident that if that bill that passed the Senate were put on the floor of the House today, it would win a majority of the House,” Carney said. “And I think that it would win significant Republican votes.”

#### Cuba policy changes require tons of political capital and trade off with the rest of Obama’s agenda

Global Post 10 – “Midterms and a changing face of Congress,” November 10, 2010, online: <http://www.globalpost.com/webblog/cuba/midterms-and-changing-face-congress>

The November 2 midterm elections resulted in a new balance of power in Congress, most notably in the House of Representatives—now a Republican majority house. Domestic implications aside, the shift in power will have a significant effect on foreign policy initiatives, not least of which (for our purposes) is Cuba policy.¶ First of all, the next head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—changing because the majority party has the privilege of holding this seat—will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), the unrelenting anti-Castro, pro-embargo ranking Republican. She will replace Representative Howard Berman (D-CA), an advocate for modest rapprochement with Havana and co-sponsor of stalled bipartisan legislation to end the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba.¶ To be fair, we were not counting on much happening regarding the embargo in the short term, even with a Democratic House. But with Ileana at the helm of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, any loosening of restrictions will be out of the question. Significant changes in Cuba policy, without some sort of unforeseen breakthrough, will almost certainly be tabled until 2012.¶ Of course, although President Obama cannot lift the heavy embargo legislation on his own, he can use his executive authority to dismantle parts of it.¶ But it is highly unlikely that the President will spend any of his diminished political capital on the issue of Cuba when there is so little potential gain for him in doing so. The likely cost—say, a storm of ill will from Republicans in Congress and from an easily angered public that is vigilant these days for signs of executive overreach—simply outweighs any benefit that might emerge… a positive reaction from the global community, perhaps? The promise of applause from partners abroad has not been the impetus for any change on U.S. policy toward Cuba in prior years and will not be now, not even when the entire body of the United Nations General Assembly (save Israel) condemns the embargo. Every year the vote is taken and every year the tiny U.S. team has become more outnumbered: in 2008 the vote was 185 to 3; in 2009, 187 to 3; and now in 2010 (last week), 187 to 2—the two being the United States and Israel, a country whose citizens freely travel to, spend and invest in Cuba.¶

#### PC Key to Immigration

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It is exactly that sort of say-no attitude among Republicans that the White House has signaled it will highlight in its immigration push.¶ Obama himself said there won’t always be agreements, but in his repeated praise for “reasonable Republicans,” he made clear that he will continue to point to conservative and tea party-affiliated Republicans as the impediment to the progress he seeks — and pushing GOP lawmakers on this issue, as he did in the recent fiscal fights, to sign on to some version of the Senate’s latest compromise.¶ “We all know that we have divided government right now,” Obama said Thursday. “There’s a lot of noise out there, and the pressure from the extremes affect how a lot of members of Congress see the day-to-day work that’s supposed to be done here.”

#### Reform’s key to heg

Nye 12 Joseph S. Nye, a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye

CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small number of Native Americans, everyone is originally from somewhere else, and even recent immigrants can rise to top economic and political roles. President Franklin Roosevelt once famously addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution – a group that prided itself on the early arrival of its ancestors – as “fellow immigrants.”¶ In recent years, however, US politics has had a strong anti-immigration slant, and the issue played an important role in the Republican Party’s presidential nomination battle in 2012. But Barack Obama’s re-election demonstrated the electoral power of Latino voters, who rejected Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney by a 3-1 majority, as did Asian-Americans.¶ As a result, several prominent Republican politicians are now urging their party to reconsider its anti-immigration policies, and plans for immigration reform will be on the agenda at the beginning of Obama’s second term. **Successful reform will be an important step in preventing the** decline of American power**.**¶ Fears about the impact of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity are not new. The nineteenth-century “Know Nothing” movement was built on opposition to immigrants, particularly the Irish. Chinese were singled out for exclusion from 1882 onward, and, with the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, immigration in general slowed for the next four decades.¶ During the twentieth century, the US recorded its highest percentage of foreign-born residents, 14.7%, in 1910. A century later, according to the 2010 census, 13% of the American population is foreign born. But, despite being a nation of immigrants, more Americans are skeptical about immigration than are sympathetic to it. Various opinion polls show either a plurality or a majority favoring less immigration. The recession exacerbated such views: in 2009, one-half of the US public favored allowing fewer immigrants, up from 39% in 2008.¶ Both the number of immigrants and their origin have caused concerns about immigration’s effects on American culture. Demographers portray a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. Hispanics will comprise 25% of the population, with African- and Asian-Americans making up 14% and 8%, respectively.¶ But mass communications and market forces produce powerful incentives to master the English language and accept a degree of assimilation. Modern media help new immigrants to learn more about their new country beforehand than immigrants did a century ago. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that the latest immigrants are assimilating at least as quickly as their predecessors.¶ While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population.¶ For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades.¶ Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to economic power: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation**, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US.**¶ In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition**, skilled immigrants can be important to** particular sectors – and to long-term growth. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies.¶ Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s soft power. The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. The US is a magnet, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US.¶ Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting hard and soft power, immigration enhances both.¶ Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely **because the US attracts the best and brightest** from the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US.¶ That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting **immigration reform** in his second term, he **will** have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US.

#### Loss of hegemony causes global instability

Kagan 12, Senior Fellow at Brookings (Robert, 3/14/12 “America has made the world freer, safer and wealthier” CNN,[http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp\_c1](http://us.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp_c1" \t "_blank))

We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today -- the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline. But that is wishful thinking. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order? People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by major wars among great powers and culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known up to that point. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported will decline, too. Or they may collapse altogether as we transition into another kind of world order, or into disorder. We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

### 1nc – t-increase

**Interpretation – Economic engagement is direct investment – not removal of RESTRICTIONS**

Haass, 2K – Brookings Foreign Policy Studies director

[Richard, and Meghan O'Sullivan, "Introduction" in Honey and Vinegar, ed. by Haass and O'Sullivan, google books]

Architects of engagement strategies have a **wide variety** of incentives from which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans, and economic aid." Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans, or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govem it rank among the most potent incentives in today's global market."

**Violation – the aff only gets rid of something that PREVENTS engagement, but doesn’t directly INCREASE engagement**

**That’s a voting issue**

**They explode the topic – every possible restrictions suddenly becomes a viable aff**

**And they wreck neg ground – they can get claim advantages off getting rid of restrictions, but not defend INVESTMENT**

### 1nc – schmitt

#### The ethical endorsement of the 1AC establishes a new order for humanity. Their methodology shapes a world that requires the production of a violent other and the extermination of that other. Instead of an inclusive or utopian society, the affirmative will justify wars of annihilation in the name of difference.

Odysseos 08, Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan,” Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008

In The Concept of the Political Schmitt had already indicted the increased usage of the terminology of ‘humanity’ by both theorists and institutional actors such as the League of Nations (1996a). His initial critique allows us to illuminate four distinct criticisms against contemporary world politics’ ethical recourse to the discourse of humanity (cf. Odysseos 2007b). The first objection arises from the location of this discourse in the liberal universe of values. By using the discourse of humanity, the project of a universal ethics reverberates with the nineteenth century ‘ringing proclamations of disinterested liberal principle’ (Gowan 2003: 53) through which ‘liberalism quite successfully conceals its politics, which is the politics of getting rid of politics’ (Dyzenhaus 1998: 14). For Schmitt, the focus of liberal modernity on moral questions aims to ignore or surpass questions of conflict altogether: it is therefore ‘the battle against the political - as Schmitt defines the political’, in terms of the permanency of social antagonism in politics (Sax 2002: 501). The second criticism argues that ‘humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity corresponds to it. The eighteenth century humanitarian concept of humanity was a polemical denial of the then existing aristocratic feudal system and the privileges accompanying it’ (Schmitt 1996a: 55). Outside of this historical location, where does it find concrete expression but in the politics of a politically neutral ‘international community’ which acts, we are assured, in the interest of humanity? (cf. Blair 1999). The ‘international community is coextensive with humanity…[it]possesses the inherent right to impose its will…and to punish its violation, not because of a treaty, or a pact or a covenant, but because of an international need’, a need which it can only determine as the ‘secularized “church” of “common humanity”’ (Rasch 2003: 137, citing James Brown Scott).2 A third objection, still, has to do with the imposition of particular kind of monism: despite the lip-service to plurality, taken from the market (Kalyvas 1999), ‘liberal pluralism is in fact not in the least pluralist but reveals itself to be an overriding monism, the monism of humanity’ (Rasch 2003: 136). Similarly, current universalist perspectives, while praising ‘customary’ or cultural differences, think of them ‘but asethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture – a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents’ (Brennan 2003: 41).One oft-discussed disciplining effect is that, politically, the ethics of a universal humanity shows little tolerance for what is regarded as ‘intolerant’ politics, which is any politics that moves in opposition to its ideals, rendering political opposition to it illegitimate (Rasch 2003: 136). This is compounded by the fact that liberal ethical discourses are also defined by a claim to their own exception and superiority. They naturalise the historical origins of liberal societies, which are no longer regarded as ‘contingently established and historically conditioned forms of organization’; rather, they ‘become the universal standard against which other societies are judged. Those found wanting are banished, as outlaws, from the civilized world. Ironically, one of the signs of their outlaw status is their insistence on autonomy, on sovereignty’ (ibid.:141; cf. Donnelly 1998). Most importantly, and related to this concern, there is the relation of the concept of humanity to ‘the other’, and to war and violence. In its historical location, the humanity concept had critical purchase against aristocratic prerogatives; yet its utilisation by liberal ethical discourses within a philosophy of an ‘absolute humanity’, Schmitt feared, could bring about new and unimaginable modes of exclusion (1996a,2003,2004/2007): By virtue of its universality and abstract normativity, it has no localizable polis, no clear distinction between what is inside and what is outside. Does humanity embrace all humans? Are there no gates to the city and thus no barbarians outside? If not, against whom or what does it wage its wars? (Rasch2003: 135). ‘Humanity as such’, Schmitt noted, ‘cannot wage war because it has no enemy’,(1996a: 54), indicating that humanity ‘is a polemical word that negates its opposite’ (Kennedy 1998: 94; emphasis added). In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argued that humanity ‘excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being’ (1996a: 54). However, in his 1950 book with an international focus, The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt noted how only when ‘man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity, did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman’ (2003a: 104). It becomes apparent that, historically examined, the concept of humanity engenders a return to a ‘discriminatory concept of war’, by which Schmitt meant that it reintroduces the legitimacy and need for substantive causes of justice in war (Schmitt 2003b: 37-52). This in turn disallows the notion of justus hostis, of a ‘just enemy’ – explored in section three – associated with the notion of non-discriminatory interstate war which took the shape of guerreen for me (Schmitt 2003a: 142-144). The concept of humanity, therefore, shatters the formal concept of justus hostis, allowing the enemy to now be designated substantively as an enemy of humanity as such. This leaves the enemy of humanity with no value and open to dehumanisation and political and physical annihilation (Schmitt 2004: 67). In discussing the League of Nations, Schmitt highlights that, compared to the kinds of wars that can be waged on behalf of humanity, the interstate European wars from 1815 to 1914 in reality were regulated; they were bracketed by the neutral Great Powers and were completely legal procedures in comparison with the modern and gratuitous police actions against violators of peace, which can be dreadful acts of annihilation (Schmitt2003a: 186). Enemies of humanity cannot be considered ‘just and equal’. Moreover, they cannot claim neutrality: one cannot remain neutral in the call to be for or against humanity or its freedom; one cannot, similarly, claim a right to resist or defend oneself, in the sense we understand this right to have existed in the international law of Europe (the jus publicum Europeaum). Such a denial of self-defence and resistance ‘can presage a dreadful nihilistic destruction of all law’ (ibid.: 187). When the enemy is not accorded a procedural justice and formal equality, the notion that peace can be made with him is unacceptable, as Schmitt detailed through his study of the League of Nations, which had declared the abolition of war, but in rescinding the concept of neutrality only succeeded in the ‘dissolution of “peace”’ (ibid.: 246). It is with the dissolution of peace that total wars of annihilation become possible, where ‘the other’ cannot be assimilated, or accommodated, let alone tolerated: the friend/enemy distinction is not longer taking place with a justus hostis but rather between good and evil, human and in human, where ‘the negative pole of the distinction is to be fully and finally consumed without remainder’ (Rasch 2003: 137). Finally, the ethical discourse of a universal humanity can be discerned in the tendency to normalise diverse peoples through legalisation and individualisation. The paramount emphasis placed on legal instruments and entitlements such as human rights transforms diverse subjectivities into ‘rights-holders’. ‘[T]he other is stripped of his otherness and made to conform to the universal ideal of what it means to be human’, meaning that ‘the term “human” is not descriptive, but evaluative. To be truly human, one needs to be corrected’ (Rasch 2003: 140 and 137; cf. Young 2002;Hopgood 2000). What does this correction in its ‘multiform tactics’, which include Michel Foucault’s proper terms of discipline and training, aim to produce? The answer may well be the proper, free (masterful), equal and rational (in its self-interest)subject of rights, of capitalism and the governmentalised state (Foucault 2001a). As Gil Anidjar notes, the operation of the traditional binary ‘sovereign/enemy’ is transformed ‘in the disciplinary society (which signals, according to Foucault, the dissolution of sovereign power) into “disciplinary regime/criminality” (or, for that second term, legal subject, subject of the law, and, of course, “man”)’ (Anidjar 2004:42; emphasis added). Of equally great importance is transformation that follows in the transition from a disciplinary to a governmental economy of power: this is what we are at the moment confronting and must analyse: what are the paths towards which the other as enemy is directed by (a global) governmentality and, moreover, what forms, subjectivities, etc., is the ‘enemy’ encouraged to take in the form of an unavoidable freedom, along the lines articulated by Foucault under the heading of ‘self government’(2007b).

#### Alternative: Only rejecting the ethics of obligation prevents the annihilation of difference and unending violence. We should embrace the space of the political through the endorsement of enmity.

#### Our obligation lies in the openness of the political order. Liberalized politics is too limited in scope and ignores the pluriversal nature of the political. That’s critical to real inclusion.

Odysseos 08, Dr. Louiza Odysseos, University of Sussex Department of International Relations, “Against Ethics? Iconographies of Enmity and Acts of Obligation in Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan,” Practices of Ethics: Relating/Responding to Difference in International Politics Annual Convention, International Studies Association, 2008

The paper ends with a discussion of obligation. Outlining the contours of a notion of political, rather, than ethical obligation, however, may require some explicit distancing from the now-familiar accounts that have oriented critical ‘ethical’ endeavours for some time. So we ask again the ethical question which has haunted us: from whence does obligation originate? Were we to be still enthralled by a Levinasian or generally any ‘other-beholden’ thought of being ‘hostage’ to the other, we might say that the face to face encounter installs obligation before representation, knowledge and other ‘Greek’ relationalities (Levinas 1989: 76–77; Odysseos 2007a: 132-151).Caputo, however, warns us off this kind of commitment to a notion of perfectible or total obligation. He asks that we recognise that ‘one is always inside/outside obligation, on its margins. On the threshold of foolishness. Almost a perfect fool for the Other. But not quite; nothing is perfect’ (1993: 126). The laudable but impossible perfectibility of ethics and ethical obligation to the other must be rethought. This is because ‘one is hostage of the Other, but one also keeps an army, just in case’ (ibid.).Caputo is not speaking as a political realist in this apparently funny comment. He is pointing, I suggest, to the centrality of politics and enmity. Obligation is not to the other alone; it is also to the radical possibility of openness of political order, which allows self and other to be ‘determined otherwise’ (Prozorov 2007a). Analytically, we also want to know the tactics and subjective effects of being directed towards enforced freedom. In this way, we might articulate a political and concrete act obligation that is inextricably tied to freedom that is not ‘enforced’, that is not produced for us, or as ‘us’.nWith Schmitt, one might say that obligation points practically (i.e. politically) to the ‘relativisation of enmity’. Obligation may not, however, be towards the enemy as such, for the enemy is the pulse of the political – so long as the enemy is relative (yet can be killed) in the order, the openness of the order can be vouched safe in the disruption of the absolutism of its immanence (Ojakangas 2007; Schmitt 1995a). We might, then, recast Schmitt’s conception of the political (which he regards as coming into being in the decision which distinguishes between friend and enemy) through his later emphasis in Theory of the Partisan on the politically normative significance of the relativisation of enmity. In other words, we might say that what needs to remain possible is the constant struggle ‘between constituent and constituted power’(Beasley-Murray 2005: 221) in both society and also world order. It is important to identify the ethical and governmental project of enforced freedom because doing so allows us to think of obligation as related to a different freedom: freedom as resistance (not freedom as an attribute). Prozorov suggests that an ‘ontology of concrete freedom’ relies on ‘freedom of potentiality of being other wise, of being able to ‘to assert one’s power as a living being against the power, whose paradigm consists in the “care of the living”’ (2007a: 210-211). This assumes, however, first, that resistance lies in the ‘refusal of biopolitical care that affirms the sovereign power of bare life’ ((Prozorov 2007a: 20) and, second, that there is a sort of ‘radical freedom of the human being that precedes governmental care’ (Prozorov2007a: 110). I argue in conclusion, however, that freedom as resistance is still too limited; it may still be, despite all attempts, lured back to a thinking of an essence: of that prior state of pre-governmental production of subjectivity, which in actuality does not exist. Rather, Foucault’s brief intervention on the issue of obligation (2001b) through the International Committee against Piracy points to ‘a radically interdependent relationship with practices of governmentality’ (Campbell 1998: 516) to which we are all subjected, here understood in the proper Greek sense of our subjectivity being predicated on governmental practice (cf. Odysseos 2007a: 4). ‘We are all members of the community of the governed and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity’, Foucault had argued, as against obligation understood within modern humanism (Foucault 2001b: 474; emphasis added). This obligation which he invokes simply exists (es gibt), as Heidegger might say. We would add that Schmitt’s account of the transition from ‘real’ to ‘absolute’ enmity in the twentieth century and his demand that ‘the enemy is not something to be eliminated out of a particular reason, something to be annihilated as worthless..’ must be read in this way (Schmitt2004: 61): as speaking for the need to ward off the shutting down of politics. That is why Schmitt’s two iconographies rest precisely on two extremes: the mythic narratives of an order open to enmity as its exteriority, which guarantees pluriversal openness, on the one hand, and the absolute immanence of order where ‘absolute enmity driv[es] the political universe’ on the other hand (Goodson 2004b: 151).This is a notion of a world-political obligation that ‘is a kind of skandalon for ethics, which makes ethics blush, which it must reject or expel in order to maintain its good name…’ (Caputo 1993: 5). This obligation is articulated for the openness that enmity brings; it attends to the other as enemy by allowing, against ethics, for the continued but changeable structurations of the field of politics, of politics as pluriverse.

#### The affirmatives attempt at developing a utopian and inclusive society results in crusades against the other. That results in extermination camps and biopolitical conflict.

Thorup 06, Mikkel Thorup, lecturer and researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and History of Ideas at the University of Aarhus in Denmark, In Defense of Enmity – Critiques of Liberal Globalism, Ph.D. Dissertation, January 2006, <http://rudar.ruc.dk/bitstream/1800/2068/1/In_defence_of_enmity_-_pdf.pdf>

Another register in which the lines are blurred or rather non-existent is in the biopolitical enmity as theorized by Michel Foucault (2003; Kelly 2004) and Giorgio Agamben (1998). Here, we most clearly see the blurring of lines. In the biopolitical enmity, the enemy is named in biological and psychological terms and the enemy is found within the social body. The line between an inside, the friends, and an outside, the enemies, is no longer meaningful. The enemy lives among us and the biopolitical state takes it upon itself to single out those, who threaten the health of the community. This concept of enmity is also highly discriminatory. It establishes a hierarchy of worthy life and starts to talk about 'life unworthy of being lived' and its annihilation (Agamben 1998: 136), most dramatically and tragically executed in the Nazi concentration and euthanasia program but for both Foucault and Agamben a constitutive element in modernity. The goal of a biopolitical war is not to reach a modus vivendi with the enemy but to eliminate him. This is a total war: ... the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. (Foucault 2003: 256, my italics) What the biopolitical enmity makes clear is the normalization of the exceptional, as the biopolitical state declares war on parts of its own population, not only in form of extermination but also quarantining of the sick, surveillance, exclusions, imprisonments, institutionalization of the abnormal etc. The heroic battles are replaced by micro-technologies that maximize the mortality of some groups and minimize it for others. Instead of individual killings, we get what Ernst Fraenkel with a very precise expression called 'civil death' (1969: 95) or what Foucualt called 'statistical death'. The sovereign does not manifest himself in splendid displays of power, public executions, but in the actions of the secret police, disappearances and extermination camps (Foucault 2003: chap. 11). The biopolitical state emerges, where racism and statism meets. It is no longer: 'We have to defend ourselves against society', but 'We have to defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other, the subrace, the counterrace that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence' ... we see the appearance of a State racism: a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification (Foucault 2003: 61-2)

### 1nc – shunning

#### The affirmative engages with known human rights abusers-— *moral duty* to shun

Beversluis 89 — Eric H. Beversluis, Professor of Philosophy and Economics at Aquinas College, holds an A.B. in Philosophy and German from Calvin College, an M.A. in Philosophy from Northwestern University, an M.A. in Economics from Ohio State University, and a Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Education from Northwestern University, 1989 (“On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 2, April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via JSTOR, p. 17-19)

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger I want to smash your [end page 17] face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict. But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing … morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a **duty** (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but **also to support that moral order**. Consider that the moral order itself **contributes significantly** to people's rights being respected. It does so by **encouraging and reinforcing** moral behavior and by **discouraging and sanctioning** immoral behavior. In this moral community people **mutually reinforce** each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be **much more violation of people's rights**. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute **a direct attack on the moral order**. When the violation of human rights is **flagrant**, **willful**, and **persistent**, the offender is, as it were, thumbing her nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually **undermine altogether** the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the [end page 18] weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentant sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone **flagrantly**, **willfully**, and **repeatedly** violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, **must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order**. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces **support for the moral order** and **backs up the announcement with action**. This action **reinforces the commitment to the moral order** both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his call for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.) Further, shunning may have **a moral effect** on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to her that she is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by **moral suasion** what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of **moral sanction**, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order. Punishment then can be viewed as a way of **maintaining the moral order**, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it. Yet not every immoral action requires that we shun. As noted above, we live in a fallen world. None of us is perfect. If the argument implied that we may have nothing to do with anyone who is immoral, it would consist of a reductio of the very notion of shunning. To isolate a person, to shun him, to give him the "silent treatment," is a serious thing. Nothing strikes at a person's wellbeing as person more directly than such ostracism. Furthermore, not every immoral act is an attack on the moral order. Actions which are repented and actions which are done out of weakness of will clearly violate but do not attack the moral order. Thus because of the serious nature of shunning, it is defined as a response not just to any violation of the moral order, but to attacks on the moral order itself through flagrant, willful, and persistent wrongdoing. We can also now see why failure to shun can under certain circumstances suggest complicity. But it is not that we have a duty to shun because failure to do so suggests complicity. Rather, because we have **an obligation to shun** in certain circumstances, when we fail to do so others may interpret our failure as **tacit complicity** in the **willful**, **persistent**, and **flagrant immorality**.

### 1nc – ag

#### Cuba is transitioning to sustainable agriculture because the embargo- the plan reverses that

Gonzalez, 03 - Professor of International Law at Seattle University. (Carmen, 2003. "Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in Cuba". Tulane Environmental Law Journal. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=987944)

Cuba was able to transform its agricultural development model as a consequence of the political and economic autonomy occasioned by its relative economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international financial and trade institutions.411 Paradoxically, while the U.S. embargo subjected Cuba to immense economic hardship, it also gave the Cuban government free rein to adopt agricultural policies that ran counter to the prevailing neoliberal model and that protected Cuban farmers against ruinous competition from highly subsidized agricultural producers in the United States and the European Union.412 Due to U.S.¶ pressure, Cuba was excluded from regional and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.413 Cuba also failed to reach full membership in any regional trade association and was barred from the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).414 However, as U.S. agribusiness clamors to ease trade restrictions with Cuba, the lifting of the embargo and the end of Cuba’s economic isolation may only be a matter of time.415 It is unclear how the Cuban government will respond to the immense political and economic pressure from the United States to enter into bilateral or multilateral trade agreements that would curtail Cubansovereignty and erode protection for Cuban agriculture.416 If Cuba accedes to the dictates of agricultural trade liberalization, it appears likely that Cuba’s gains in agricultural diversification and food self-sufficiency will be undercut by cheap, subsidized food imports from the United States and other industrialized countries.417 Furthermore, Cuba’s experiment with organic and semi-organic agriculture may be jeopardized if the Cuban government is either unwilling or unable to restrict the sale of agrochemicals to Cuban farmers—as the Cuban government failed to restrict U.S. rice imports in the first half of the twentieth century.418 Cuba is once again at a crossroads—as it was in 1963, when the government abandoned economic diversification, renewed its emphasis on sugar production, and replaced its trade dependence on the United States with trade dependence on the socialist bloc. In the end, the future of Cuban agriculture will likely turn on a combination of external factors (such as world market prices for Cuban exports and Cuba’s future economic integration with the United States) and internal factors (such as the level of grassroots and governmental support for the alternative development model developed during the Special Period). While this Article has examined the major pieces of legislation that transformed agricultural production in Cuba, and the government’s implementation of these laws, it is important to remember that these reforms had their genesis in the economic crisis of the early 1990s and in the creative legal, and extra-legal, survival strategies developed by ordinary Cubans.419 The¶ distribution of land to thousands of small producers and the promotion of urban agriculture were in response to the self-help measures undertaken by Cuban citizens during the Special Period. As the economic crisis intensified, Cuban citizens spontaneously seized and cultivated parcels of land in state farms, along the highways, and in vacant lots, and started growing food in patios, balconies, front yards, and community gardens. Similarly, the opening of the agricultural markets was in direct response to the booming black market and its deleterious effect on the state’s food distribution system. Finally, it was the small private farmer, the neglected stepchild of the Revolution, who kept alive the traditional agroecological techniques that formed the basis of Cuba’s experiment with organic agriculture. The survival of Cuba’s alternative agricultural model will therefore depend, at least in part, on whether this model is viewed by Cuban citizens and by the Cuban leadership as a necessary adaptation to severe economic crisis or as a path-breaking achievement worthy of pride and emulation. The history of Cuban agriculture has been one of resistance and accommodation to larger economic and political forces that shaped the destiny of the island nation. Likewise, the transformation of Cuban agriculture has occurred through resistance and accommodation by Cuban workers and farmers to the hardships of the Special Period. The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the subjection of Cuba to the full force of economic globalization will present an enormous challenge to the retention of an agricultural development model borne of crisis and isolation. Whether Cuba will be able to resist the re-imposition of a capital-intensive, export-oriented, import-reliant agricultural model will depend on the ability of the Cuban leadership to appreciate the benefits of sustainable agriculture and to protect Cuba’s alternative agricultural model in the face of overwhelming political and economic pressure from the United States and from the global trading system.

#### Cuban agriculture is key to solve the environment

Peters 10 (Kathryn A. Peters, J.D. from the University of Oregon . "Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution". University of Oregon Law School. law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

While urban agriculture was a response to a dramatic crisis in ¶ Cuba’s history, through the development of a community-based ¶ system of cultivation on previously vacant lots employing organic ¶ farming techniques, Cuba has created a sustainable food production ¶ system.189 As of 2005, Havana was producing over ninety percent of ¶ the perishable produce consumed in its city as well as a significant ¶ portion of its milk and meat.190 With government support, the urban ¶ gardens have become a profitable economic enterprise for many ¶ Cubans.191 Local access to fresh foods has added diversity to the ¶ Cuban diet and reduced the carbon footprint associated with its food ¶ supply by reducing the transportation and chemical input required to ¶ grow and transport the food.192 The development of urban farming ¶ has also ensured food security for Cuba.193 The success of Cuba’s ¶ system has established the country as a model for the urban ¶ production of sustainable agriculture around the world.194¶ In transitioning to a sustainable urban agricultural system, Cuba ¶ has drastically reduced its harmful impacts on the environment. ¶ Cubans have been able to significantly reduce their carbon footprints ¶ as their food supply is no longer shipped across oceans and Cuban ¶ residents can walk to local markets for fresh produce rather than drive¶ to grocery stores.195 Reduced mechanization in food production ¶ further reduces carbon emissions. Increased urban vegetation also ¶ mitigates the impact of climate change because vegetation has a ¶ cooling effect when air temperatures are high.196 Because much of ¶ Cuba’s urban land is now vegetative, surface temperatures in Cuba ¶ may remain cooler due to the thermoregulation created by the ¶ vegetation cover.197¶ According to Dr. Nelso Camponioni Concepción, the Cuban ¶ government, through its urban agricultural program, aims “to gain the ¶ most food from every square meter of available space.”198 By ¶ utilizing available urban space for sustainable food production, Cuba ¶ is reducing its impact on the planet’s carrying capacity. The organic ¶ urban gardening techniques do not consume greenspace or harm the ¶ environment; therefore, measuring the true cost of externalities is not ¶ an issue. The growth of the urban gardens has created an increasing ¶ food supply and a new economy for many Cubans without negatively ¶ impacting the environment or society.

#### Billions die and risks extinction

Cummins and Allen, 10 (Ronnie, Int’l. Dir. – Organic Consumers Association, and Will, Policy Advisor – Organic Consumers Association, “Climate Catastrophe: Surviving the 21st Century”, 2-14, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/14-6)

The hour is late. Leading climate scientists such as James Hansen are literally shouting at the top of their lungs that the world needs to reduce emissions by 20-40% as soon as possible, and 80-90% by the year 2050, if we are to avoid climate chaos, crop failures, endless wars, melting of the polar icecaps, and a disastrous rise in ocean levels. Either we radically reduce CO2 and carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e, which includes all GHGs, not just CO2) pollutants (currently at 390 parts per million and rising 2 ppm per year) to 350 ppm, including agriculture-derived methane and nitrous oxide pollution, or else survival for the present and future generations is in jeopardy. As scientists warned at Copenhagen, business as usual and a corresponding 7-8.6 degree Fahrenheit rise in global temperatures means that the carrying capacity of the Earth in 2100 will be reduced to one billion people. Under this hellish scenario, billions will die of thirst, cold, heat, disease, war, and starvation. If the U.S. significantly reduces greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will follow. One hopeful sign is the recent EPA announcement that it intends to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately we are going to have to put tremendous pressure on elected public officials to force the EPA to crack down on GHG polluters (including industrial farms and food processors). Public pressure is especially critical since "just say no" Congressmen-both Democrats and Republicans-along with agribusiness, real estate developers, the construction industry, and the fossil fuel lobby appear determined to maintain "business as usual."

### 1nc – hospitality

#### Unconditional hospitality is bad – puts the host in a constant state of guilt, leads to paralysis since no actions can truly be “ethical,” it causes immense suffering and prevents obligation towards particular individuals.

Gerasimos Kakoliris, 1-20-2009, School of Humanities, The Hellenic Open University, Patras, Greece, “Jaques Derrida on Unconditional and Conditional Hospitality,” http://books.google.com/books?id=\_42Oiy7nn80C&pg=PA68&lpg=PA68&dq=unconditional+hospitality+unethical&source=bl&ots=JLCIczBd3u&sig=Iui9VNVHL\_1xV-PnjzYBXERPSRA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DKDtUbGLHeHhygGt4YHYAQ&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=unconditional%20hospitality%20unethical&f=false

The accession to this “hyperbolic” ethics of hospitality places us in a permanent situation of “had conscience.” or “guilt”. The “absolute” or “hyperbolic” law of hospitality precludes someone from ever being hospitable enough. Therefore, one is always guilty and he or she must always ask for forgiveness for never welcoming the other enough. Moreover, one should feel also guilty and, therefore, ask forgiveness for the fact that the hospitality he or she offers can be transformed into a weapon, a confirmation of his or her sovereignty, or even omnipotence, or an appeal for recognition since “one always takes by giving.” One must, therefore, a priori, ask forgiveness for the gift of hospitality itself, for the sovereignty or the desire of sovereignty of the gift of hospitality.d As Derrida declares: “So you cannot prevent me from having a had conscience, and that is the main motivation of my ethics and my poIitics.c It seems that, since such an ethics is “hyperbolic”, it prohibits any decision from being absolutely ethical. This prohibition is, in a certain sense, the dissolution of the possibility of ethical decision. For, how one can reconcile the fact that while, for Derrida. hospitality is given to the irreducible, singular entity, simultaneously, unconditional hospitality, as universal law, obliges hospitality to he given to anyone indiscriminately. Because, as Derrida himself recognizes, “as soon as I relate to an irreducible singular one, I am betraying another one, or I introduce a third one who disturbs or corrupts the singular relation to the other.” Hence, the more “absolute” or “hyperbolic” the ethics of hospitality becomes the more unethical it becomes. By demanding the unconditional welcome of the stranger, beyond the possibility of any discrimination, pure or absolute hospitality can lead not only to the destruction of one’s home, but also to the suffering or even the death of the host, since the person who enters can be a murderer. Consequently, if hospitality ought to be given, according to the law of unconditional hospitality, to anyone indiscriminately, then it seems legitimate for someone to think, when he or she engages in the experience of decision-making. that “no one has more weight than anybody else.” As Derrida poses it in The Gift of Death.8 why should I look after this particular cat and not the other cats? Yet. do we not usually experience the sense that — even if we can agree that there are lots of situations where we can never be absolutely sure of this — somebody has some sort of prior claim? Hence, to place at the centre of the experience of decision-making the idea that hospitality is an absolutely general obligation to everybody is to render any notion of special obligation towards persons who are in urgent need of it rather problematic. For, the unconditional law excludes the possibility of any kind of discrimination between individuals.

#### Universal hospitality kills ethics and morals – renders decision-making impossible.

Richard Kearney, 1-01-2001, Charles Seelig professor of philosophy at Boston College, author of over 20 books on European philosophy and literature, “Others and Aliens; Between Good and Evil,” from “Evil After Postmodernism; Histories, Narratives, and Ethics,” https://www2.bc.edu/~kearneyr/pdf\_articles/pl86217.pdf

The difficulty with this analysis of hospitality is that it seems to preclude our need to differentiate between good and evil aliens, between benign and malign strangers, between saints and psychopaths (though admittedly 99 per cent of us fall somewhere between the two). If hospitality is to remain absolutely just and true, all incoming others must remain unidentifiable and undecidable. Derrida appears to claim as much when he declares that for pure hospitality or pure gift to occur there must be absolute surprise . . . an opening without horizon of expectation . . . to the newcomer whoever that may be. The newcomer may be good or evil, but if you exclude the possibility that the newcomer is coming to destroy your house, if you want to control this and exclude this terrible possibility in advance, there is no hospitality. . . . The other, Like the Messiah, must arrive whenever he or she wants.10 For Derrida, aliens only come in the dark (like thieves in the night), and we are always in the dark when they come. We are never sure who or what they are; we cannot even be sure if we are hallucinating or not. For the absolute other is without name and without face, an “impossible, unimaginable. unforseeable, unbelievable, absolute surprise.” The best we can do is try to read between the lines and make a leap of faith, an impossible leap of faith, like Abraham, like Kierkegaard. But why not add — and here’s my difficulty with thc undecidable — “like Jim Jones or David Koresh” or other figures of mystical madness who believe they are recipients of messianic messages from some Other they call God? If all reading is reading in the dark, how can we discern between holy and unholy spirits, how distinguish between the deities of peace and justice and those of horror and destruction? Joseph Campbell. for one, has much to say about messianic monsters in The Power of Myth. a cautionary reminder (it seems to me) of the need for some kind of ethical decision: “By monster I mean some horrendous presence or apparition that explodes all your standards for harmony, order and ethical conduct.. . . That’s God in the role of destroyer, Such experiences go past ethical judgements. Ethics is wiped out.. . God is horrific.”2 To be absolutely hospitable is to suspend all criteria of ethical or juridical discrimination. And in such non-discriminate openness to alterity we find ourselves unable to differentiate between good and evil, which is a fine lesson in tolerance but not necessarily in moral judgement. 1f there is a difference between Jesus and Jim Joncs, between Saint Francis and Stalin, between Melena and Mengele. between Siddhartha and the Marquis de Sade and I think most of us would want to say there is — then some further philo sophical reflections are needed to supplement the deconstructive gesture of hospitality. Deconstructive non-judgementalism needs to be supplemented, I suggest. with a hermeneutics of practical wisdom.

### 1nc – framing

#### The reversibility of “the other” as a subject position means Levinasian ethics always devolve into a relationship of domination in a face to face encounter

Hägglund, PhD candidate in Comparative Literature at Cornell University, 2006 (Martin, “The Necessity of Discrimination,” Project Muse)

As a result, Levinas's injunction of unconditional submission before the other cannot be sustained. Although Levinas claims to proceed from the face-to-face relation, he evidently postulates that the subject in the ethical encounter either gazes upward (toward the Other as the High) or downward (toward the Other as someone who is helplessly in need, bearing "the face of the poor, the stranger, the widow and the orphan" as a refrain declares in *Totality and Infinity*). But regarding all the situations where you are confronted with an other who assaults you, turns down the offered hospitality, and in turn denies you help when you need it, Levinas has nothing to say. If the other whom I encounter wants to kill me, should I then submit myself to his or her command? And if someone disagrees with me, should I then automatically accept this criticism as a law that is not to be questioned or counterattacked? Questions like these make it clear that Levinas does not at all found his ethics on an intersubjective encounter. Rather, he presupposes that the ethical encounter exhibits a fundamental asymmetry, where the other is an absolute Other who reveals the transcendence **[End Page 52]**of the Good. Accordingly, Levinas condemns every form of self-love as a corruption of the ethical relation, and prescribes that the subject should devote itself entirely to the other. To be ethical is for Levinas to be purely disinterested, to take responsibility for the other without seeking any recognition on one's own behalf.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/diacritics/v034/34.1hagglund.html" \l "FOOT19) It suffices, however, to place yourself face-to-face with someone else to realize that the asymmetry assumed by Levinas is self-refuting. If you and I are standing in front of each other, who is the other? The answer can only be doubly affirmative since "the other" is an interchangeable term that shifts referent depending on who pronounces the words. I am an other for the other and vice versa, as Derrida reinforces in "Violence and Metaphysics." Derrida's argument not only contradicts Levinas's idea of the absolutely Other, but also undercuts his rhetoric. That "the other" is a reversible term means that all of Levinas's ethical declarations can be read against themselves. To say that the I should subject itself to the other is at the same time to say that the other should subject itself to the I, since I am a you and you are an I when we are others for each other. To condemn the self-love of the I is by the same token to condemn the self-love of the other. Indeed, whoever advocates a Levinasian ethics will be confronted with a merciless irony as soon as he or she comes up to someone else and face-to-face declares, "You should subject yourself to the Other," which then literally means, "You should subject yourself to Me, you should obey My law."

#### Nuclear war outweighs – possibility of extinction outweighs all ethical principles

Kateb, professor @ Princeton University, 1984 [George, The Inner Ocean]

Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous an acknowledgment that the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility—a genuine possibility— as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctive-ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizeable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to earth’s uninhabitability, to “nuclear winter,” or as Schell’s “republic of insects and grass.” But the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or “theater” use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizeable exchange of because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect of nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counter on to seek expression later.

#### Consequentiallism key to progressivism – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible

Isaac, 2002

(Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” *Dissent*, Spring)

But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global *politics*. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism.

#### Moral absolutism is complicity with violence – it allows people to die for the sake of clean hands

Isaac, 2002

(Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” *Dissent*, Spring)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Even if we can’t predict the future with certainty, it means we must be even more wary of future crises

Kurasawa, Assistant Professor of Sociology at York University, Toronto, and a Faculty Associate of the Center for Cultural Sociology at Yale, 2004

(Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales,” Constellations Volume 4 No. 11, December)

When engaging in the labor of preventive foresight, the first obstacle that one is likely to encounter from some intellectual circles is a deep-seated skepticism about the very value of the exercise. A radically postmodern line of thinking, for instance, would lead us to believe that it is pointless, perhaps even harmful, to strive for farsightedness in light of the aforementioned crisis of conventional paradigms of historical analysis. If, *contra* teleological models, history has no intrinsic meaning, direction, or endpoint to be discovered through human reason, and if, *contra* scientistic futurism, prospective trends cannot be predicted without error, then the abyss of chronological inscrutability supposedly opens up at our feet. The future appears to be unknowable, an outcome of chance. Therefore, rather than embarking upon grandiose speculation about what may occur, we should adopt a pragmatism that abandons itself to the twists and turns of history; let us be content to formulate *ad hoc* responses to emergencies as they arise. While this argument has the merit of underscoring the fallibilistic nature of all predictive schemes, it conflates the necessary recognition of the contingency of history with unwarranted assertions about the latter’s total opacity and indeterminacy. Acknowledging the fact that the future cannot be known with absolute certainty does not imply abandoning the task of trying to understand what is brewing on the horizon and to prepare for crises already coming into their own. In fact, the incorporation of the principle of fallibility into the work of prevention means that we must be ever more vigilant for warning signs of disaster and for responses that provoke unintended or unexpected consequences (a point to which I will return in the final section of this paper). In addition, from a normative point of view, the acceptance of historical contingency and of the self-limiting character of farsightedness places the duty of preventing catastrophe squarely on the shoulders of present generations. The future no longer appears to be a metaphysical creature of destiny or of the cunning of reason, nor can it be sloughed off to pure randomness. It becomes, instead, a result of human action shaped by decisions in the present – including, of course, trying to anticipate and prepare for possible and avoidable sources of harm to our successors.

#### “Responsibility to the other” depoliticizes action – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained

Zizek, 1999 (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)

Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that the bombing of Yugoslavia, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this did not come into being in some irresponsible way, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the \_Sueddeutscher Zeitung\_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.

## 2nc

### Critique

#### The result of totalizing ethical views is what causes group thin – this strips all life of meaning

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One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people - we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

#### Derridian infinite responsibility only brings about infinite hostility toward the other as one attempts to eliminate otherness as a prerequisite for identification.

Prozorov, Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, in ‘8

[Sergei, “De-Limitation: The Denigration of Boundaries in the Political Thought of Late Modernity” in The Geopolitics of European Identity, ed. Noel Parker, pg. 31-2]

However, it is also possible to combine denigration of boundaries with the elevation of the other to a position infinitely superior to the self. This is most strikingly exemplified by the Levinasian “postmodern” ethics of the later works of Derrida, which establishes an asymmetric relationship between the self and the other, whereby it is precisely the other who calls the self in question, and paves the way for the assumption of infinite responsibility of the self to the other, which in fact constitutes the self as an ethical subject (cf. Levinas 1969; Derrida 1992; 1996). The very borderline between self and other thus evaporates in the reconstruction of this rela- tion in terms of radical dependence. Insofar as every self is presumably someone’s other, we arrive at radical interdependence. Contrast Schmitt’s (1976) construction of self-other (friend-enemy) relations in terms of existential equality, in which both figures emerge simultaneously and do not preexist the act of their discrimination. A Derridean postmodern ethics posits the self as an effect of the encounter with the other and conditions the ethicality of the self by the assumption of infinite responsibility before the other (see Moran 2002; Sharpe 2002). This difference from Schmitt is highly illuminating in the context of de-limitation. Schmitt resisted the absolutization of the other, because for him the elimination of boundaries that divide the self and the other would bring about not absolute hospitality but absolute hostility, the desire for the elimination of the other (see Ojakangas 2004, ch. 4). This logic is far easier to grasp than the assumption of infinite responsibility of the self to something that is not merely different but, in the Derridean axiom, “wholly other”—with which one logically can have no common identity and, therefore, no possibility of empathy or, for that matter, any relation at all. It is, therefore, hardly puzzling that all empirical concretizations of post- modern ethics easily fall short. At its worst, the ethics of responsibility to “otherness” turns out just as hypocritical as liberal multiculturalism, depriving the other of its “otherness” through a kind of forced empathy: a demand for the inclusion of the other into the liberal-democratic order of tolerance that is oblivious to the fact that it is frequently the very resistance to this inclusion that constitutes the other as other. At its best, this ethics is resigned to indecision and passivity, doomed to the endless contemplation of its own momentous impossibility (see Prozorov 2005). In either case, however, we observe an elementary gesture of the effacement of boundaries between the self and the other through the postulate of their radical interdependence.

#### The aff/ notion for the other is merely a valorization of marginal groups that is constitutive of the social activist and critical intellectual self. Empathy implies identification.

Prozorov, Department of International Relations, Petrozavodsk State University, in ‘5

[Sergei, "X/Xs: toward a general theory of the exception." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 30.1, Jan-March]

With regard to this notion of otherness, it is important to delineate it from the rather ambiguous and incoherent concept of the Other frequently deployed in poststructuralist studies. What is at stake is not a facile gesture of demonstrating the dependence of one's identity on the exclusion of the other and then proceeding to advocate "responsibility to Otherness," (17) which empirically comes down to the valorization of marginal, repressed, and otherwise disadvantaged groups, a valorization which is in fact constitutive of one's conception of the self (as a social activist or a critical intellectual). The inconsistency is immediately apparent: there is little that is so very "other" about the usual figures of otherness deployed in critical thought, both empirically (insofar as the very sympathy or concern for the cause of the other renders his otherness questionable) and conceptually (the notion of alterity is hardly apt for an ethics that ultimately professes empathy with the other's cause and hence must logically presuppose at least a minimal degree of identification).

#### Derrida admits that a pursuit toward pure hospitality will, IN ALL INSTANCES, fail. The world is violent, human nature steers towards selfishness, and the consequent power structures sustaining injustices are needed to extend hospitality in the first place. Without ownership and control there cannot be the possibility of hosting *anyone*.

#### Foster, oxford PhD, 7

[Jason, “Hospitality: The Apostle John, Jacques Derrida, and Us” (<http://thirdmill.org/newfiles/jas_foster/jas_foster.hospitality.pdf>) T.a]

Derrida is aware that such a radical take on hospitality carries certain risks with it. He is quite frank in saying that the result of this kind of hospitality might be “terrible because the newcomer may be a good person, or may be the devil." 30 But to Derrida, it does not matter who it is. Pure hospitality is completely unconditional and has no limits whatsoever. The door is always open; the lock is always unlocked. Pure hospitality is extended and given without any prior knowledge of who we are extending it to. 31 This is what Derrida means by the "other;" receiving and embracing newcomers we truly know nothing about at all. 32 For Derrida, no question or inquiry we might make to a potential guest is virtuous because such questions are merely impure attempts to classify the person into our own predetermined categories of being. 33 The Mediterranean/Johannine idea of testing (and its modern counterpart – sizing people up) is clearly frowned upon by Derrida. Pure hospitality is the unconditional "hospitality of visitation" which introduces radical surprise into hospitality. This stands in contrast to actual hospitality's "hospitality of invitation," which makes hospitality a gated and conditional product of our own self-centered preferences, and is extended only on our own terms. 34 Derrida believes the actual hospitality of our day is violent in forcing restrictive conformity through enforcing conditions upon those to whom it is extended. In effect, Derrida believes the structure of barriers and restrictions we adopt as the masters of our space when we extend actual hospitality to others renders these "others" as strangers and refugees. 35 For Derrida, our actual hospitality rests upon behavioral conditions and prerequisites that tacitly advocate limits on the extent to which we're willing to be trespassed by our guests. This makes our hospitality inhospitable. Derrida mostly tends to blame Kant's "universal hospitality" 36 for this problem that carried with it accepted standards of conduct, and time limits on its extension. 37 Because Derrida's messianic future is indeterminate and beyond the horizon of expectation, pure hospitality, as such, is impossible to achieve and he acknowledges this. His pure hospitality is an eschatological ideal that can never be realized in a violent world. 38 Derrida sees the world as thoroughly violent, with violence interwoven into all aspects of society and impossible to avoid. Derrida believes all human hospitality is tainted by narcissism that leads to some degree of insincerity when we extend hospitality to others. When we give, we are always selfishly looking for something in return, 39 whether it be a tangible gift or an intangible feeling of selfcongratulation for being liked and appreciated by our guests. For Derrida, hospitality is always an economy of exchange, and gift-giving is never purely altruistic. 40 Thus, pure hospitality is unachievable in Derrida's vision. He longs for a messianic future that he believes will never materialize. His deconstruction of hospitality is so thorough that it leaves us nowhere, at least in my view. The very nature of actual hospitality assumes and perpetuates a structure of inequality between host and guest that of itself must be eliminated if we are to have true and pure hospitality. 41 Lest anyone think this is simply an issue between individuals, Derrida believes the ramifications are thoroughly global in nature and speak to the reality that "[h]ospitality is culture itself…ethics is hospitality; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality." 42 But because this "power structure" is the basis for hospitality in the first place and depends on it for its very existence, it is impossible to rid ourselves of it, even though the breaking down of this structure of inequality and barriers is the goal of pure hospitality

. As with the step of testing, Derrida clearly resists the well defined roles and behavioral expectations of host and guest that are intrinsic in the Mediterranean process of hospitality that is an understood reality of the Johannine corpus. Without ownership and control, there is no longer the possibility of hosting anyone under any real circumstance. The impossibility of pure hospitality is demonstrated each time we extend actual hospitality. The possible highlights the impossible, and actually increases the chasm between the two. This chasm between Derrida's pure hospitality and our actual hospitality is unconquerable, and he knows it. 44 It is little wonder then, that his interpreter, John Caputo, describes Derrida as a man of "prayer and tears." 45

### Politics

#### Obama solves superpower syndrome---and if he doesn’t, the plan only makes it worse by triggering a conservative backlash---cut some Lifton updates

Robert J. Lifton 11, aff guy, 2011, Witness to an Extreme Century: A Memoir, p. 405-406

With all of the American angst during the first year or so of the Obama administration, one may readily forget the power of the historical moment of his election in 2008. BJ and I had a few friends in to watch the returns on the sleek television set in our living room, which we had purchased four years earlier for a similar gathering that had resulted in a roomful of despair and suspicion of fraud in relation to the Bush victory. But this time, in 2008, the television set did not betray us, and my reaction of not just joy but ecstasy, including tears, was hardly mine alone. What was special to me, though, was the quick realization that the outcome meant an end to the country's superpower syndrome. But was that the case? Only partly, it turns out. Certainly Obama and his administration have renounced the principle of American omnipotence in favor of more modest claims about our capacities and influence in the world. Apocalypticism and totalistic behavior have given way to something closer to Camus's "philosophy of limits" with an acceptance of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. And most important, there has been a specific rejection of nuclearism and a call for abolition of the weapons.

Yet despite all that, the syndrome lingers in crucial areas that specifically connect with my work. Concerning nuclear abolition, Obama has not followed through with clear American policies, despite an impressive convocation of world leaders on the subject of nuclear danger. On revelations of torture, and more recently of illegitimate medical experiments in relation to torture, Obama has mostly tried to sidestep the issue and avoid legal culpability of those involved. Finally, his decision to send added troops to Afghanistan seems to me to be the stuff of war-making, and atrocity-producing, blunder. In all three cases there is a certain clinging to the very American omnipotence being renounced. I have found myself torn between joining a considerable segment of the left in a condemnation of shortcomings that perpetuate elements of the superpower syndrome, and an alternative inclination to defend Obama as an incremental reformer who needs more time.

I took the latter position in a series of discussions with Howard Zinn, who denounced Obama as "a Chicago politician" and a hypocrite. I still don't agree with that judgment but I am also willing to take a public stand of strong opposition to Obama policies on Afghanistan and on American torture and recently revealed experimentation. Yet I remain sensitive as well to the importance of supporting the Obama administration in the face of new waves of right-wing American totalism and potential violence in the backlash over the election of our first African-American president.

### Case

#### Giving the Other a cookie and asking to be biffles is not a good idea when the Other is trying to murder you with an axe. Their ‘radical hospitality’ leads to fetishist disavowal of atrocities – sometimes the Other is a faceless monster and a strategy of alienation is necessary for peace.

Naida Zukić, 11-xx-2009, assistant professor in BMCC’s Department of Speech, Communications and Theater Arts, “My Neighbor’s Face and Similar Vulgarities,” http://liminalities.net/5-4/neighbor.pdf

In positioning the neighbor as the monstrous other, Žižek reads the neighbor against Lacanian structures of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and the Real. More specifically, Žižek distinguishes between Imaginary others, which are our mirror-like relationships of mutual recognition; The Symbolic Big Other, which is “the impersonal set of rules that coordinate our coexistence”, and finally, The Other qua Real, which is “the impossible Thing, the ‘inhuman partner,’ the Other with whom no symmetrical dialogue, mediated by the symbolic Order, is possible” (“Neighbors” 143). To understand the radical Otherness inscribed in the element of the neighbor it is crucial to understand how these three Lacanian dimensions are connected. For Žižek, the neighbor as the Thing means that, “beneath the neighbor as my semblant, my mirror image, there always lurks the unfathomable abyss of radical Otherness, of a monstrous Thing that cannot be gentrified”(ibid). Žižek designates the figure of the neighbor as the ultimate object of desire in its intensity and impenetrability—the neighbor that disturbs, tortures, and is always too close. Importantly, between the Imaginary Other and the Impenetrable Real Other must step in the Symbolic Other that gentrifies their chaotic dimensions: In order to render our coexistence with the Thing minimally bearable, the symbolic order qua Third, the pacifying mediator, has to intervene: the “gentrification” of the Other-Thing into a “normal human fellow” cannot occur through our direct interaction, but presupposes the third agency to which we both submit ourselves—there is no intersubjectivity (no symmetrical, shared, relation between humans) without the impersonal symbolic Order (“Neighbors” 143-4). The neighbor is fittingly given a more unsettling dimension as the impenetrable Other, the enemy whose radical ambiguity and traumatic character do not prepare the ground for a possibility of an authentic encounter. Consequently, the impossibility of such encounters brings about the alienation of social life, which is woven into the practices, rituals, and social texture of everyday life: Even if I live side by side with others, in my normal state I ignore them. I am allowed not to get too close to others. I move in a social space where I interact with others obeying certain external “mechanical” rules, without sharing their inner world (Žižek, Violence 59). “Sometimes alienation is not a problem, but a solution,” indispensable for peaceful coexistence (ibid). Brutality feels at home in Višegrad, and the ethnic cleansing of this city was an ordinary affair, writes Maass. “Bosnia makes you question basic assumptions about humanity, and one of the questions concerns torture. Why after all should there be any limit?” (51). At the beginning of the war, paramilitary Serb forces came to town, rounded up unarmed Muslim men, and loaded them into refrigerated meat trucks. An older Muslim man who was forced to push the corpses into the river managed to escape, and later gave his testimony. The Serbs took these men to the railing of the Višegrad bridge, the man confessed, forcing them to lean forward, at which point they would either slit their throats or shoot them. They threw them all into the river. ... They ordered me and a man who was even older than me to walk toward the bridge. We came across the body of an old man with a mutilated head. They ordered us to drag him toward the bridge. As we were dragging the old one, his skull was falling open and the brain came out. We dragged the body to the bridge and they ordered us to throw it into Drina. There were two more bodies on the bridge. They had their throats cut. We were ordered to throw them into the river as well. On one of the bodies, four fingers on the left hand were freshly cut off (9). This is the neighbor When confronted with neighbor-on-neighbor violence whom do I save? The neighbor? Myself? Who do I attack? If I attack, am I just another neighbor? As a journalist, Peter Maass is not supposed to get involved in the events he covers, so he stands aside and watches a man on the verge of execution because it is a prudent thing to do. Is this much different from the “Serbs who prudently kept quiet as their Bosnian neighbors were shot or packed off to prison camps?” (21). A tragically misplaced ethical conviction? Perhaps. What about brutal acts of torture about which we know but choose to ignore? The atrocious reality of the death camps, tortures, and mass executions does not reside in the immediate reality of the violence, but in Maass’s blindness to this accumulated atrocity—the fetishist disavowal (i.e., how this violent event appears to him, not the violent event itself). In an act that suspends symbolic efficiency of witnessing torture and suffering, the watcher relies on a gesture of fetishist disavowal: “I know, but I don’t want to know that I know, so I don’t know. I know it, but I refuse to fully assume the consequences of this knowledge, so that I can continue acting as if I don’t know it” (Žižek, Violence 53). This disavowal involves a violation of his spontaneous ethical proclivity, brutal repression, and self-denial. For Levinas, what would make this event ethical, is precisely Maass’s proximity to the Other, for his proximity makes him answer for his responsibility to the neighbor. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas takes into account the self-referential face of the neighbor. To encounter the face and claim that a face can “guarantee itself,” is to acknowledge the face as the nonlinguistic point of reference between the ‘big Other’ of the symbolic order and the neighbor-as-Other (202). For Žižek, however, the human face is always already caught up in the symbolic order, engaged as that which gentrifies the reality of the neighbor (“Neighbors” 146). The neighbor is therefore never revealed in the face of the Other, but in his/her defacement: “Far from displaying ‘a quality of God’s image carried with it,’ the face is the ultimate ethical lure…The neighbor is not displayed through a face; it is in his or her fundamental dimension a faceless monster” (ibid 185).

#### Applying universal hospitality to politics is silly if the Other rejects your hospitality – causes net more suffering.

Gilbert Leung1 and Matthew Stone2, 4-1-2009, Birkbeck, University of London1, London Metropolitan University2, “Otherwise than Hospitality: A Disputation on the Relation of Ethics to Law and Politics,” http://repository.essex.ac.uk/4465/1/Otherwise\_than\_Hospitality.pdf

In this essay, we would like to consider a potential critique of Derrida’s application of an ethics of hospitality to a politics. Given that this project started as a debate between the authors at the 2007 Critical Legal Conference, it seemed appropriate that the style of the essay should follow the excitement of a dialectic that is quasi-Socratic in form. In section one, we give an overview of Derrida’s notion of hospitality and then proceed in section two to critique the ontological violence in hospitality through the positing of an other who rejects hospitality. For this other, we ask why we should pursue hospitality on a political level when it would be far less violent to not offer hospitality in the first place. The third section serves as a counter-critique or self-critique which focuses on the nature of the relation between ethics and politics and the distinction between conceiving the other as either transcendent or transimmanent. The concluding section tangentially expands on this by looking at the violence endured and the kind of hospitality proffered \* G. Leung, Birkbeck, University of London; M. Stone, London Metropolitan University.2 Law and Critique (2009) vol. 20 no. 2, 193–206. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com in order for this essay to come before you as a joint collaboration between two authors using the first person plural and which ends with one ‘dissensual’ signature.

### UTIL

#### And, reversibility means a rape victim is required to empathize with the rapist

Jack M. Balkin, Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice-- Part II, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1131, 1994, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/trans02.htm

#### Derrida's ethics of Otherness has a second component: It employs a different sense of individuality and uniqueness. Under this view, justice requires one to speak in the language of the Other by trying to see things from the Other's point of view. (78) This conception of justice seems most attractive when we are the injurer or the stronger party in a relationship, or when we are in the position of a judge who is attempting to arbitrate between competing claims. For example, suppose that we are the State, the stronger party, the oppressor, or the injurer, or suppose that we are contemplating an action that might put us in such a position. It seems only just that we should try to understand how we have injured or oppressed the Other (or might be in a position to injure or oppress). We can only do this if we try to see the problem from the Other's perspective and understand her pain and her predicament in all of its uniqueness. The duty we owe to the Other is the duty to see how our actions may affect or have affected the Other; to fulfill this duty we must put away our own preconceptions and vocabulary and try to see things from her point of view. Similarly, if we are a judge in a case attempting to arbitrate between the parties, the ethics of Otherness demands that we try to understand how our decision will affect the two parties, and this will require us to see the matter from their perspective. Suppose, however, that we are not the injurer, but the victim; not the State, but the individual; not the strong, but the weak; not the oppressor, but the oppressed. Does justice require that we speak in the language of the person we believe is injuring or oppressing us? Must a rape victim attempt to understand her violation from the rapist's point of view? Does justice demand that she attempt to speak to the rapist in his own language - one which has treated her as less than human? Must a concentration camp survivor address her former captor in the language of his worldview of Aryan supremacy? We might wonder whether this is what justice really requires, especially if the injustice we complain of is precisely that the Other failed to recognize us as a person, refused to speak in our language, and declined to consider our uniqueness and authenticity.

#### More evidence, even if we think we’re God, you think you’re the left hand of God which is ultimately more dangerous

Zupancic, Alenka. Ethics of the Real. Verso, 2000

We do not contest the validity of this argument per se. But the problem is that it leaves us with an image of Kantian ethics which is not very farm from what we might call an ‘ethics of tragic resignation’: a man is only a man; he is finite, divided in himself—and therein lies his uniqueness, his tragic glory. A man is not God, and he should not try to act like God, because if he does, he will inevitably cause evil. The problem with this stance is that it fails to recognize the real source of evil (in the common sense of the word). Let us take the example which is most frequently used, the Holocaust: what made it possible for the Nazis to torture and kill millions of Jews was not simply that they thought they were gods, and could therefore decide who would live and who would die, but the fact that they saw themselves as instruments of God (or some other Idea), who had already decided who could live and who must die. Indeed, what is most dangerous is not an insignificant bureaucrat who thinks he is God but, rather, the God who pretends to be an insignificant bureaucrat. One could even say that, for the subject, the most difficult thing is to accept that, in a certain sense; she is ‘God’, that she has a choice. Hence the right answer to the religious promise of immortality is not the pathos of the finite; the basis of ethics cannot be an imperative which commands us to endorse our finite and renounce our ‘higher’, ‘impossible’ aspirations but, rather, an imperative which invitees us to recognize as our own the ‘infinite’ which can occur as something that is ‘essentially a by-product of our actions. What the advocates of the Kantian exclusion of ‘diabolical evil, fail to see, or simply pass over in silence, is the symmetry of the (highest) good and the (highest) evil. In excluding the possibility of ‘diabolical evil’ we also exclude the possibility of the good; we exclude the possibility of ethics as such or, more precisely, we posit the ethical act as something which is in itself impossible, and exists only in its perpetual failure ‘fully’ to realize itself.

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#### Topical affirmatives must expand ECONOMIC ties toward the target country—

Celik ‘11. Arda Can Celik. MA Politics & Intl Studies, Uppsala University. “Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies.” Pg. 11

Introduction Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behaviour which involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to create economic intersection, interconnectness, and mutual dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This interdependence serves the sender stale to change the political behaviour of target stale. However they cannot be counted as carrots or inducement tools, they focus on long term strategic goals and they are not restricted with short term policy changes.(Kahler&Kastner,2006) They can be unconditional and focus on creating greater economic benefits for both parties. Economic engagement targets to seek deeper economic linkages via promoting institutionalized mutual trade thus mentioned interdependence creates two major concepts. Firstly it builds strong trade partnership to avoid possible militarized and non militarized conflicts. Secondly it gives a leeway lo perceive the international political atmosphere from the same and harmonized perspective. Kahler and Kastner define the engagement policies as follows "It is a policy of deliberate expanding economic ties with and adversary in order to change the behaviour of target state and improve bilateral relations ".(p523-abstact). It is an intentional economic strategy that expects bigger benefits such as long term economic gains and more importantly; political gains. The main idea behind the engagement motivation is stated by Rosecrance (1977) in a way that " the direct and positive linkage of interests of stales where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others in the same direction.

#### “Increase” means to become larger or greater in quantity

Encarta 6 – Encarta Online Dictionary. 2006. ("Increase" http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620741)

in·crease [ in krss ]  
transitive and intransitive verb  (*past and past participle* in·creased, *present participle* in·creas·ing, *3rd person present singular* in·creas·es)Definition**:**make or become larger or greater: to become, or make something become, larger in number, quantity, or degree  
noun  (*plural* in·creas·es)

**Preserving topicality is key to becoming effective civic arguers – internal-link turns their kriitk**

**Olson 06** - Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Wisconsin (Kathryn M. “The Epideictic Lens: The Unrealized Potential of Existing Argumentation Theory to Explain the Bush Administration’s Presentation of War with Iraq.” In *Engaging Argument*, edited by Patricia Riley, 18-28. Washington, D.C.: National Communication Association, 2006.

So, I conclude with three of this reading's implications for our own research, pedagogy and civic action. *First, epideictic argument must get every bit as much critical attention and practical application in our teaching, research, and citizenship as do deliberative and forensic*—particularly since epideictic can "pass" for the other two quite easily, and it is relatively invulnerable to judgments and refutations launched from the other frames. We need to equip ourselves and our students to immediately recognize, incisively articulate, and participate effectively in the epideictic frame with its distinctive proof requirements, comparative logic, building protection for the arguer, tendency to tranquilize audience action, and special refutation possibilities—especially when it is deployed in public debates where it technically is not "supposed" to be used (e.g., in preparation for war). For all the value that the recent discussions of "deliberative democracy" offer, let them not blind us to the fact that the public in a democracy relies at least as much on nondeliberative rhetorical forms in its operations.

*Second, bring back topicality as an actual voting issue in academic debate.* Jim rightly observes that intercollegiate debate is a key training ground for the public sphere and that policy debate's heavy "reliance on authority and quotation as proof diminishes the complexity of the notion of evidence" (Klumpp, 2005, p. 14). To move debaters beyond this dependent, secondary spewing toward more independent, nuanced and critical analysis requires competitive incentives to develop such fluency. Topicality is the central issue that teaches and tests one's precision and awareness of specific language—and equips one to hold others' responsible for theirs, regardless of the argumentative genre(s) in play. Effective civic arguers need not only to know, but also to be practiced at articulating

, explaining in lay terms and defending against such arguments, which rely less on evidence than on extended careful reasoning. But, if judges will more likely vote on a sloppy link to a large impact disadvantage than a carefully crafted, precisely explained analysis of key language, why would these competitive souls invest their time to develop these more transferable language analysis skills?

**Reasonability is arbitrary – it’s impossible to determine what is “reasonable” because it differs from judge to judge forcing judge intervention – we have evidentiary support**

**Stone 1923** — Justice in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit [Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 F. 597; 1923 U.S. App. LEXIS 2531; 34 A.L.R. 249, No. 6192; No. 6193, Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, December 5, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis]

Where the use of land affects others, the use must be "reasonable" to escape liability for resultant damage to others. What is "reasonable" depends upon a variety of considerations and circumstances. It is an elastic term which is of uncertain value in a definition. It has been well said that "reasonable," means with regard to all the interest affected, his own and his neighbor's and also having in view public policy. But, elastic as this rule is, both reason and authority have declared certain limitations beyond which it cannot extend. One of these limitations is that it is "unreasonable" and unlawful for one owner to physically invade the land of another owner. There can be no damnum absque injuria where there is such a trespass.

### ag

#### Warming causes extinction – none of their impact cards come close to saying that the war would actually kill everyone

Flournoy 12 – Citing Feng Hsu, PhdD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center, Don FLournoy, PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of Technology, Former Manager for Unviersity/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, “Solar Power Satellites,” January 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

#### Urban agriculture has drastic impacts on environmental concerns – emissions, pollution, and energy consumption

Ergas 13 (Christina Ergas, Global Research, reviewing and citing a book by Sinan Coont, the only book devoted entirely to describing Cuba’s agriculture, “Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba”, April 19, 2013, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/food-sovereignty-sustainable-urban-agriculture-in-cuba/5332167>, js)

Urban agriculture and reforestation projects also constituted important gains for the environment. Shifting food production away from reliance on fossil fuels and petrochemicals is better for human health and reduces the carbon dioxide emissions associated with food production. Urban reforestation projects provide sinks for air pollution and help beautify cities. Finally, local production of food decreases food miles. It also requires both local producers and consumers. Therefore, community members get to know each other and are responsible for each other through the production and consumption of food.